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chapter 1
Searching for Common Ground: Jews and
Christians in theModernMiddle East
H.L. Murre-van den Berg
In the late 1990s, the taxi driver of a Tehran cab changed the cassette tape to the
engaging sounds of the Hebrew song Hava Nagilah (‘Let us rejoice’), a Jewish
favorite for festive occasions. Not quite knowing whether I was being provoked
into anti- or pro-Israel sentiments, I somewhat cowardly indicated approval
without asking for details. While the tape played on, the conversation was not
pursued further, and I later asked some Iranian friends what they made of it.
They laughed at my discomfort and told me Israeli music was quite popular
in Tehran and easily procured at the bazaar. As long as politics were kept out
of it, the culture of the archenemy was not a problem. It was only later that I
learned about the thrivingmusic culture in Iran and in the ArabMiddle East of
which Jews and Christians formed an intrinsic part. Especially in Iran, Jewish
ensembles were popular among all classes of the population and HavaNagilah
was often performed at weddings, even after the majority of Jews left Iran in
the years following the Islamic Revolution.
While the link between this earlier musical scene and the 1990s interest
in Israeli music is perhaps an indirect one, both phenomena point to music
as a locus of interaction and sharing even between communities that are
antagonistic. Often, this thriving and thoroughlymixedmusic culture has been
quoted as an example of how people of different religious communities in the
Middle East could live and party well together, sharing a common local culture.
The Tehran example indicates that this may have been too rosy a picture of
how these societies functioned in thepast andpresent, not only because shared
cultural practices do not necessarily imply shared outlooks on society, but also
because even seemingly innocent songs have political overtones thatmight not
always be shared by those who pass them on, but which remain part of the
song’s afterlife for thosewhowant to see it.1 At the same time, cultural practices
1 The song Hava nagila (composed in Palestine, 1920s) has a nationalist ring, with the vocabu-
lary of the refrain ‘uru, ahim,’ ‘Awake, brothers,’ echoing, among others, George Antonius’ title
and motto on Arab nationalism (taken from a nineteenth-century poem by Ibrahim Yazeji,
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such as these continue to be used and interpreted as my friends interpreted
them, as a sign of communality over borders created by religion and politics. It
is precisely this ambiguity, between the political and the ostensively neutral,
that provides space for the participation of those to whom politics proper
would otherwise be closed off.
This volume discusses cultural practices that in different ways constituted
common ground between the various groups that made up Middle Eastern,
especially ArabMiddle Eastern societies in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. It does so based on the premise that such cultural issues never
constitute a separate domain apart from political and economic participa-
tion, but that they are part and parcel of patterns of interaction with all kinds
of political implications. These cultural practices, therefore, address issues of
power and presence of the so-calledminorities inmultiple ways. Thus, without
dealing with the political participation of non-Muslims in Muslim dominated
states as such, this volume aims to focus on the ways in which non-Muslims
contributed to creating and developing spaces of encounter. These spaces of
encounter sometimes took the form of actual political debates, but also took
the form of literal spaces of encounter with public rituals or participation in
language and educational reform. It is these types of common ground that con-
stitute the main theme of this volume.
The contributors of this volume all participated in a conference that was
organized in September 2013 by a Leiden research group based in the Insti-
tute for Religious Studies at the Faculty of Humanities, in cooperation with
lucis, the Leiden Centre for the Study of Islam and Society. This research
group, funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (nwo)
works on a project entitled Arabic and its Alternatives: Religious Minorities
in the Formative Years of the Modern Middle East (1920–1950). The project’s
focus is mostly on the British mandate areas of Iraq and Palestine, and this
is reflected in the fact that most contributions to the conference and in this
volume have the same strong focus on these two emerging states. This intro-
duction and some of the contributionsmake a start in contextualizing theways
in which non-Muslims in the Britishmandate areas acted andwere acted upon
against the background of the larger ArabMiddle East, also in FrenchMandate
“Arise, ye Arabs, and awake”), Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National
Movement (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938). Compare also Naum Fayiq’s poem in Classical
Syriac, “Awake, Son of Assyria” (1920), see David Gaunt, “Relations between Kurds and Syriacs
and Assyrians in Late Ottoman Diyarbekir,” in Joost Jongerden, Jelle Verheij, Social Relations
in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870–1915 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 250.
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areas. For that reason, the Maghreb is explicitly included, with its vibrant Jew-
ish communities in mostly French-ruled contexts. This inclusion allows for a
comparison of the two largest non-Muslim communities not only in contexts
where the two communities lived alongside each other, but also where one of
them dominates the local scene.
Rather thanmerely introducing the main themes of the search for common
ground as described by this volume’s authors, this introductory article pays
special attention to the developments within the Christian communities, par-
allel to Schroeter’s article on the Jewish communities. Over the last decades,
the interwar developments of the Middle Eastern Christian communities have
attracted considerable research attention. Thorough work has been done on
the Coptic Christians in Egypt,2 as on Palestine’s Christians, often from the per-
spective of the wider nationalist movement, but not exclusively so.3 Recently,
the Assyrians in Iraq and Iran, after many years of near neglect, have found
historians to write their story.4 The post-World War i history of the Armenian,
Syriac Orthodox and the various Catholic communities of Lebanon, Syria and
Iraq, however, is scantily covered. Especially Lebanon’s Christian history is usu-
ally subsumed in more inclusive narratives that do not always topicalize a spe-
cific ‘Christian’ experience.5While this is understandable from the perspective
of those who want to emphasize the inclusive nature of Lebanese history, it
2 Vivian Ibrahim, The Copts of Egypt: The Challenges of Modernisation and Identity (London/
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Heather Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary
Encounters in An Age of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
3 Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2011), Noah Haiduc-Dale, Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism
and Nationalism, 1917–1948 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), Roland Löffler,
Protestanten in Palästina. Religionspolitik, Sozialer ProtestantismundMission in dendeutschen
evangelischen und anglikanischen Institutionen des Heiligen Landes 1917–1939 (Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer 2008).
4 Sargon George Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in Twentieth
Century Iraq (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), DavidWilmshurst, TheMartyred
Church, A History of the Church of the East (London: East &West Publishing, 2011).
5 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: the Search for Identity in Lebanon (London: I.B. Tauris,
2004/2014); For a specific focus on the Armenians, see Nicola Migliorino, (Re)Constructing
Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the Sate in the Aftermath of a
Refugee Crisis (New York: Berghan Books, 2008). A recent thesis addresses Maronite identity
in this period via the analysis of literary production: Amaya Martin Fernandez, “National,
Linguistic, and Religious Identity of Lebanese Maronite Christians through their Arabic
Fictional Texts during the Period of the FrenchMandate in Lebanon” (Ph.D. diss Georgetown
University, 2009).
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obscures both the many links to and the important differences between the
Christian history of the various Arab countries. Before discussing the major
themes of this volume from such a comparative and historiographic perspec-
tive, a number of crucial concepts that underlie the discussion need to be intro-
duced. The most important of these are minority, modernity and the public
sphere.
Minority, Modernity, and the Public Sphere
The term ‘minority,’ as common as it is nowadays, in actual usage but also in its
impliedmeanings is inextricably connected to twentieth-century nationalism.
As has been shown for the emerging state of Syria, the term ‘minority’ started
to be used in the context of the formation of the nation state, in a fluid context
in which different identities vied for prominence, and in which international
dynamics, especially those connected to the League of Nations, played amajor
role.
While in today’s parlance Jews and Christians are seen as prototypical
minorities in the Muslim world, this was generally not the case when the term
started to be used in the period followingWorldWar i. In fact, most Christians
and Jews would resist the term and the accompanying political isolation that
camewith it, seeing it as an imposition fromthemandate governments inEgypt
and Syria, often linked to earlier policies of Western protection of Christian
and Jews. An imposition, that is, that denied their longstanding cultural and
economic participation as well as limiting their possibilities of political partic-
ipation in the new states.6 Especially in Egypt, Coptic Christians successfully
resisted the label ‘minority’ precisely to ensure their position at the heart of
the debates about the future of the Egyptian state.7 In their rejection of a spe-
6 Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of
Community in French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Gudrun
Krämer, “Moving out of Place: Minorities in Middle Eastern Urban Societies, 1800–1914,”
in Peter Sluglett (ed.), The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950 (Syracuse, ny:
Syracuse University Press, 2008), 182–223; Tsolin Nalbantian, “Going Beyond Overlooked
Populations in Lebanese Historiography: The Armenian Case,” History Compass 11, no. 10
(2013): 821–832.
7 See especially SabaMahmood, ReligiousDifference inaSecularAge:AMinorityReport (Prince-
ton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016); Mahmood discusses minority discourses in
Egypt against the background of larger discussions about the state, secularism and exclusion,
both in the Middle East and Europe.
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cialminority status, these Jews andChristians distanced themselves fromother
groupswho for internal and external reasons came to identify asminorities, like
the Assyrians in Iraq and the Armenians and Syriac Orthodox in Lebanon and
Syria. Not coincidentally, most of them were recent arrivals in the new nation
states, which explains at least some of the mutual suspicion and hostility. In
this volume, the contributions by Robson and Müller-Sommerfeld deal with
the complicated process of minoritization of the Assyrians that took place in
mandate Iraq.
Gradually, however, the term minority began to refer more and more to
all Christians and all Jews, whatever their origins and cultural-linguistic back-
grounds. Despite these non-Muslims’ legal rights resulting from full citizenship
(at least for most of them), they were not seen as belonging to the core of the
nation state and often were excluded formally or informally from crucial posi-
tions. Processes like these have been described for Palestine, about which both
Sanchez Summerer (this volume) and Haiduc-Dale stress the agency of Chris-
tians (whomostly sidedwithMuslim Palestinian nationalists) and Druze (who
were more easily brought over to the Zionist side) in defining what kind of
minority they wanted to be.8 Also the Copts, in the later decades of the twenti-
eth century, started to revert on their rejection of the minority label, if only to
ensure governmental protection and international support.
Discussions about minoritization are the flip side of those about the com-
munalities undergirding the nation state. In the so-called ‘Arab provinces’ of
the former Ottoman Empire (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Pales-
tine), state formation following World War i led to an ongoing debate about
what exactly are the characteristics of the model citizen.9 While the concept
of the ‘Arab’ state seems to presuppose an Arab ethnicity (‘race’ in the terms
of the time) as the basis of the nation state, the debate over what ‘Arab’ was,
8 In addition toHaiduc-Dale’s Arab Christians, see also his “Rejecting Sectarianism: Palestinian
Christians’ Role in Muslim–Christian Relations,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 26,
no. 1 (2015): 75–88. Robson (Colonialism and Christianity) stresses the importance of British
policy that divided Palestinian society along religious lines.
9 Nadine Méouchy, Peter Sluglett, Gérard D. Khoury, The British and French Mandates in Com-
parative Perspectives / Les mandats français et anglais dans une perspective comparative (Lei-
den: Brill, 2004); Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (London: Tauris,
2007); Sami Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (2002): 205–215; Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citi-
zens: RepublicanRights, Paternal Privilege, andGender in FrenchSyria andLebanon (NewYork:
Columbia University Press, 2000), KaisM. Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State
under the Mandate (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003).
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who could be counted as Arab, andwhat the status of non-Arabs in these states
should be, was by no means resolved. Does ‘speaking Arabic’ count as ‘being’
Arabic? Who is allowed to ‘become’ Arab, and who wants to become Arab?10
Meanwhile, the debate over religion that had already started in the Ottoman
Empire in the nineteenth century continued. Does one need to be aMuslim to
be a full citizen? And if not, onwhat grounds could non-Muslims participate in
these societies?11 These ongoing debates underline that who is and who is not
a ‘minority’ is never clear-cut, is bound to change over time, and can and will
be consciously changed by those involved.
When talking about the ‘Arabness’ of the region’s Christians, often the term
‘Arab Christians’ is used. However, this term is rather vague, often including all
Christians that historically or in the contemporary period used Arabic in their
communities, the language of liturgy, written communication and literature,
if not also as a spoken vernacular.12 Such a definition then would include the
Syriac andCoptic communitieswhousedArabic alongside Syriac orCoptic, the
Maronites who were almost completely Arabic-speaking and writing but differ
greatly towhat extent they consider themselves ethnically ‘Arab’, and theGreek
Orthodox and Greek Catholics, who may still use Greek in the liturgy, but are
overwhelmingly Arabic-speaking and writing and in the contemporary period
tend to see themselves as ethnically Arab. Thus, in the modern period, Arab
Christians ismostly a blanket term for Christians from themajority of churches
in the Middle East that are literate in Arabic and often also use an Arabic
vernacular, regardless whether they consider themselves ethnically Arab or
not. However, it could also be used polemically in nationalist discussions, to
gauge one’s stand on ‘being’ an Arab or not, supporting Arabism in some of its
forms, or not. Suffice it to say that, as we shall see further on, being described as
10 James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle
East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language
and National Identity (Washington, dc: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Peter Wien,
Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941
(soas/Routledge Studies on the Middle East, 2006), Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in
the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003).
11 Bruce Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ussama Makdisi, A Culture of Sectarian-
ism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000).
12 So David Thomas’ essay ‘Arab Christianity’ in Ken Parry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to
Eastern Christianity (Malden, Oxford and Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), 2–22.
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an ‘Arab Christian’ does not automatically imply supporting Arab nationalism
and even less implies identifying as ‘Arab’.
In anattempt to avoid the ambiguities andcontingencies implied in the term
‘minority,’ often the term ‘community’ is used. For most of the authors in this
volume, Jewish and Christian ‘communities’ indeed form the starting point of
their analyses.However, the term ‘community’ bringswith it its own set of ques-
tions,most importantlywhether ornot the concept of ‘community’ ismalleable
and changeable according to circumstances and therefore just as slippery for
analysis as ‘minority.’ While this is certainly true in an absolute sense (com-
munities change in outlook, characteristics, and size), in the states under dis-
cussion here, ‘communities’ are usually defined by the less subjective notion
of legal categories. The term ‘community’ thus follows the legal structures of
the states under investigation, structures thatwere inherited from theOttoman
Empire andbefore, structures that assign a legal status to one’s religious belong-
ing.13 As an aside, it is important to note that when interpreting ‘community’ as
roughly the translation andmodern continuationof theOttomanmillet, impor-
tant differences between the two concepts are glossed over. First, inmanyways
millet, in the nineteenth-century pre-Tanzimat sense, had the clear meaning of
referring to those groups that occupied social and political subordinate posi-
tions vis-à-vis the majority of Muslims, rather than to different religiously or
ethnically defined subgroups in general. Also after these groups were officially
granted equal rights in theOttoman state, they continued tobe seen as separate
millets, whereas Muslims were not.14 Second, not all non-Muslim communi-
ties were considered a millet in the way other non-Muslims were: Maronites,
13 Krämer, “Moving out of Place”; Schroeter and Goldstein-Sabbah in this volume. As such,
communities can also be counted, by their own leaderships as well as by the state. How-
ever, reliable statistics are fewand far between. In general it is assumed that over thewhole
of the ArabMiddle East, Christianity declined from about 20 percent of the population in
the early twentieth century to less than 5 percent towards its end. Despite the tremen-
dous human impact of the genocide of Armenian, Syriac, and Assyrian Christians in the
eastern Ottoman provinces, the main factor for decline in Christians is the lower popula-
tion growth of Christians in relation to that of Muslims, see Hannelore Müller, Religionen
im Nahen Osten 1: Irak—Jordanien—Syrien—Libanon (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag,
2009).
14 See Robson (Colonialism and Christianity) on this process in Palestine; according to her
analysis, the British applied the Ottomanmillet system to Muslims also, effectively creat-
ing an additionalmillet. Whilemillet in this new sense is certainly a new phenomenon for
the Muslim community, it must be noted that the termmillet had been used for Muslims
before the nineteenth century, when the terms millet and ṭaʾifa were less strictly defined
and hence could also be used for the Muslim sub-group of the population.
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Druze, and Assyrians living outside the direct reach of Ottoman tax collectors
and state officials enjoyed a social and political independence unimaginable
for non-Muslims at the heart of the Ottoman state. This included the right to
carry arms and fight along their Kurdish or Druze neighbors that belonged to
the same tribal federations.15 Thus, while the relationship to the state differed
between millets and the majority of Muslims, as well as between raya (sub-
servient ‘flock’) and ashiret (independent clans), the importance of the com-
munity was the same for pretty much everyone. Belonging to such a group was
predicated on and governed by overlapping religiously-inspired legal frame-
works that mutually reinforced each other and bound people to the group in
which they were born.
Though the rhetoric about the abolishment of the millet-system might sug-
gest otherwise, not only did these legal structures survive in the new nation
states, but often their importance increasedunder the influence of colonial and
post-colonial bureaucratic demands. Put differently: legal equality between the
different communal groups was to be strived for, but not the disappearance of
the formal barriers between the groups. Based on the religion of one’s father (or
mother, in the case of Jews), every person ‘belonged’ to a religious community,
a belonging that in most states was and continues to be explicitly mentioned
on one’s identity papers. Independent from personal devotion or active com-
munal identification, this legal status, unless explicitly changed by conversion,
positions its members within a specific community. This implies that the reli-
gious leaders of these communities have power over important issues such as
marriage, child custody, divorce, inheritance issues, and burial.16 While such
‘communities’ also change over time, the legal framework precedes any inter-
pretation of these groups as ‘minority’, by themselves or by others. These legally
defined communities therefore formaworkable starting point for analysis, pre-
cisely in order to be able to describe the varied positions members of these
communities (in the legal sense) take in the societies to which they belong.
15 Joachim Jakob, Ostsyrische Christen und Kurden im Osmanischen Reich des 19. und frühen
20. Jahrhunderts (Vienna: lit Verlag, 2014), Géraldine Chatelard, Briser la mosaïque: les
tribus chrétiennes de Madaba, Jordanie, xixe–xxe siècle (Paris: cnrs éditions, 2004).
16 Legal systems in many of the contemporary states of the Middle East are built along the
same lines; this is true in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria; see, e.g., Chibli Mallat,
“The Lebanese Legal System,” in The Lebanon Report (1997) 2, 29–44; Esther van Eijk,
“Family Law in Syria: A Plurality of Laws, Norms, and Legal Practices,” (PhD thesis, Leiden,
2013), and Michael M. Karayanni, “Two Concepts of Group Rights for the Palestinian-
ArabMinority under Israel’s Constitutional Definition as a ‘Jewish andDemocratic’ State,”
International Journal of Constitutional Law 10, no. 2 (2012): 304–339.
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The formation of the nation states, so important in understanding the con-
cept of minority, also begs a brief discussion of the modernization processes
that took place in the Middle East. If anything, changing concepts of com-
munity and especially of people’s expectations of their participation in the
states to which they belonged are closely tied to themonumental changes that
took place between 1850 and 1950, from the early days of the Tanzimat in the
OttomanEmpire, to the independentArab states created in the 1930s and 1940s.
These changes included new expectations of education with regard to profes-
sional and personal development, of changing gender roles including women’s
participation in society, of social care and standards of health, of literature and
popular culture asmuchas expectations of newstandards of religiousdevotion,
training, and leadership, and, indeed, of societal participation and democracy.
In an intricate interplay between Western (including Russian) influences via
missionaries,welfare organizations, literary exchanges andpolitical, economic,
and diplomatic ties, and local demands and pressures at the local and state
levels, the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire started to look for ways to
reorganize their society.17
As Keith Watenpaugh describes, the modernization processes that took
place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries first and foremost
created a middle class that embodied the ideals just referred to.18 This class
consisted ofMuslims aswell as Jews andChristians, though Jews andChristians
made up a disproportionally large part of them: they, more than Muslims,
had access to new forms of education, and via education to new kinds of
jobs, new kinds of literature, and thus to new ideas about society, both within
their own communities and with an eye toward the wider society. Among
these ideas were also those about the importance of Arab identity and the
17 On the nineteenth-century processes, including the impact of western missionaries, see
Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of
the Middle East (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2008), Heleen Murre-van den
Berg, NewFaith in Ancient Lands:WesternMissions in theMiddle East in theNineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries (Leiden: Brill, 2006), Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From
Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press,
2006), AdamBecker,Revival andAwakening:AmericanEvangelicalMissionaries in Iranand
the Origins of Assyrian Nationalism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), and Paul
Sedra, From Mission to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth
Century Egypt (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); further Schroeter,Massot, andGoldstein-Sabbah
in this volume.
18 Keith David Watenpaugh, BeingModern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colo-
nialism and the ArabMiddle Class (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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Arab nationalism that accompanied it, alongside other nationalisms of the day,
Turkish, Armenian, and Assyrian.
One further aspect of this modernization process that accelerated in the
early twentieth century is themodernization of religion and religious practice.
As recently described by James Grehan, perhaps themost important and influ-
ential domain where different communities mixed, mingled, and shared, was
that of religious practice. Outside formal prayer services in churches, mosques,
and synagogues, but often with the involvement of religious leaders such as
priests, imams, and rabbis, there existed a domain of religious practices that
were shared by all in the region, regardless of religion and religious commu-
nity. The veneration of saints, the practice of ‘magic,’ and an elaborate reper-
toire of bodily movements, were practiced by Christians, Jews, Druze, Sufis,
Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims, often with rather little differentiation as to narrative
interpretation.19 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, religious
reformers of all religions increasingly began to interpret these practices as old-
fashioned, uninformed, rural, and superstitious. Such interpretations led to an
increase in the standardization of religion with regard to theological teach-
ing and ritual practices as much as with religious institutions such as schools
and church buildings, and a decline of such practices that very visibly erased
borders between religions.20 Notably, many of the practices survived until the
present day, either unacknowledged or scorned by the religious establishment,
or integrated into more ‘acceptable’ religious practices. Obviously, in the mod-
ernist interpretations of ‘common ground,’ which has been the starting point of
the contributions in this volume, this older form of shared cultural practices is
no longer considered relevant, even if it continues to exist andmay even consti-
tute an alternative ground for communality between religious groups. Inmany
cases, however, these sacred spaces become locations of contestation, over reli-
gious modernization, in service of ethnic and national belonging.21
19 James Grehan, Twilight of the Saints: Everyday Religion in Ottoman Syria and Palestine
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
20 In themissionarymodernizationproject these themesplayeda crucial role; see the studies
mentioned in n. 17.
21 Dionigi Albera and Maria Couroucli. Sharing Sacred Spaces in the Mediterranea (Bloom-
ington, in, Indiana University Press, 2012), Glenn Bowman, Sharing the Sacra: The Politics
and Pragmatics of Intercommunal Relations around Holy Places (New York, ny: Berghahn
Books: 2012). On Christian politicization of the Holy Sepulcher/Church of the Resurrec-
tion, see Raymond Cohen, Saving the Holy Sepulchre: How Rival Christians Came Together
to Rescue their Holiest Shrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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While the above is certainly too brief a summary of the extensive and sophis-
ticated debates that have taken place in analyzing processes of modernization
and nation formation, the basis that undergirded the idea for this volume and
the conference that preceded it, is that these changes enabled and encouraged
Christians and Jews to rethink their position in society. It is from this rethinking
that, implicitly or explicitly, many of the cultural practices that are described
in this volume arose.
What further resulted from these modernization processes was a reshap-
ing of the actual and metaphoric space where debates over society could take
place. While it would be a mistake to suggest that no public space between
state and government on the one hand and the private sphere of family and
close relations on the other existed in theMiddle East before the twentieth cen-
tury, the twentieth century indeed brought new forms and spaces, spaces in the
Habermassian sense, where debates over the common good were open to the
participation of thosewhowanted to be part of it. Social and literary clubs with
mixedmemberships (in term of gender and religion), newspapers in standard-
ized languages, a powerful women’s movement22 and non-sectarian political
parties all brought new participants to a discussion that before the twentieth
century would have been conducted in much smaller and more closed circles,
such as the houses of the ruling elites, (all-male) coffeehouses, sharia courts,
religious schools, bathhouses, markets or religious festivals. This public sphere
continued to evolve and change, but all of these changes allowed for a greater
variety of people to be part of it, even if actual political participation, under
mandate rule or under later autocratic Arab rulers, was still limited to a few.23
The way in which Jews and Christians, as part of the majority or as minori-
ties, participated in the emerging Arab states was characterized by a variety of
22 For an overview, see Ellen L. Fleischmann, “The Other ‘Awakening’: the Emergence of
Women’s Movements in the Middle East, c. 1900–1940,” in Karen Offen (ed.), Globalizing
Feminisms, 1789–1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 89–139. Among many
others, see also Ellen L. Fleischmann, The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian
Women’s Movement, 1920–1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Marina
Warner, Memoirs of an Early Arab Feminist: The Life and Activism of Anbara Salam Khalidi
(London: PlutoPress, 2013; Arabic original, Beirut 1978).
23 Miriam Hoexter, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Nehemia Levtzion (eds.), The Public Sphere in
Muslim Societies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Peter Sluglett (ed.),
The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750–1950 (Syracuse, ny: Syracuse University
Press, 2008); Seteney Shami, Publics, Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere
in theMiddle East andNorthAfrica (NewYork: Social Science ResearchCouncil, 2009); also
Schroeter in this volume.
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actions that are often overlooked when talking about the public sphere. It is
in the variety of such actions, from public mourning to participation in Arab
literary culture, from rap music to political demonstrations, from a preference
for French-language education tomoving to newly-builtmixedneighborhoods,
frompolitical and cultural assimilation to themajority to the separatist nation-
alisms of Assyrians and Armenians, that the full breadth of the societal choices
of the various religious communities can be shown. In the following sections,
four major themes of this volume will be discussed in more detail: the literal
space of the urban landscape, the language (especially Arabic in educational
contexts), the creation of national identities and the violence that often accom-
panied it, and, finally, transnationalism as a force to be reckoned with in the
creation of national common ground. These four themes roughly correspond
to the subdivision of the contributions to this volume, with Daniel Schroeter’s
introductory overview article on the Jews in the Middle East touching on all of
these issues, as does the final article byAomarBoum.HisworkonNorthAfrican
hip hop artists in many ways provides a counterpoint to the other essays, with
its startingpoint inMuslimyouth that use the transnational commongroundof
YouTube to address issues of exclusion and belonging, of political participation
and political impotence. Note that while the main focus of this volume and its
introduction is on the first half of the twentieth century, the analysis and some
of the examples stretch back to the nineteenth century and move forward into
the later twentieth and even early twenty-first century, in an attempt to look
at these developments from a broader perspective than the mandate period as
such.
Urban Space and Public Presence: Performances of Community
With images of the destruction of Syria’s urban centers and historic monu-
ments vividly in mind, one is reluctant to open Stefan Weber’s magnificent
two-volume work on the architectural history of Damascus in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century.24 However, doing so is perhaps the easiest way of
understanding something of the momentous changes that took place in the
urban landscape of the Middle East in this period, in Damascus as well as in
other cities of the region. His documentation of building activities such as the
24 StefanWeber, Damascus: OttomanModernity and Urban Transformation (1808–1918) (Pro-
ceedings of the Danish Institute in Damascus, 2 vols.) (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press,
2009).
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sumptuous private homes in some parts of the Old City and the new neighbor-
hoods outside the city, vividly illustrates the era of economic growth and pop-
ulation increase. More changed, however, thanmerely the scale and the luxury
of urban planning. New types of buildings were allowed to appear, changing
the outlook of the city in more fundamental ways. Some of these were con-
nected to new institutions and public services, such as government buildings,
post offices, and railway stations. Other buildings arose in conjunctionwith the
increasing presence of westerners in the city, like consular buildings, mission-
ary schools, andhospitals. And yet others embodied the socio-political changes
of the period: new churches were built in the heart of the Old City.
While there had always been churches inDamascus, somemore publicly vis-
ible than others, the Tanzimat reforms of the mid-nineteenth century made it
possible for Christians to renew and expand their old buildings and to build
new churches when and where they were needed. As described by Anais Mas-
sot in her article about Damascus in this period, the Christians of Damascus,
supported politically and financially by western Christians, made ample use of
these possibilities. Two neighborhoods of the Old City, one near Bab Tuma and
the other between the Straight Street and Bab Sharqi, changed extensivelywith
renewals of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate and new church complexes for
the Armenians, Syriacs, and Greek Catholics. Similar changes also took place
in Jerusalem, as they did in Beirut.25
Yet another form of non-Muslim public presence became much more com-
mon in post-Tanzimat times. Before the nineteenth century, Christian proces-
sions outside church grounds were rarely allowed. In her book on Copts in
seventeenth- andeighteenth-centuryEgypt, FebeArmanios describes the spec-
tacle of sending off a group of Christiansmaking pilgrimage to the Easter festiv-
ities in Jerusalem,much the sameway as Christians andMuslims would see off
those embarking on the hajj to Mecca.26 When properly negotiated and paid
for, such exceptions to the general rules of non-Muslim invisibility in the public
domain were allowed; these occurred for the most part in neighborhoods that
were predominantly inhabited by non-Muslims. After the Tanzimat reforms,
such permissions were asked for and given more frequently, and this added
another element to the public visibility of Jews and Christians.
25 See the contributions by Schroeter, Massot, andWallach in this volume. For an analysis of
more recent urban development in in multi-religious cities, see Chad F. Emmett, Beyond
theBasilica: Christians andMuslims inNazareth (Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press,
1995).
26 Febe Armanios, Coptic Christianity in Ottoman Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
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Both Schroeter and Massot describe a third element of the rules of the
newly emerging urban landscape, that of changing sartorial practices. Here
the development is in the opposite direction, away from differentiation. Tanz-
imat reforms meant that clothing no longer served to differentiate the various
groups of society. In earlier periods, certain clothing and colors, especially of
headgear that generally served to identify a wide range of different ranks and
functions of members of society, had been restricted to Muslims. More impor-
tantly, with the Tanzimat, men of all religions started to discard the various
types of traditional gear, including turbans, in favor of the fez or, in Iraq, the
siddara. This had begun in the nineteenth century; in the twentieth century,
middle-class urbanwomenof all religions followedby shedding the veil, remov-
ing yet another outward sign of gender and religious differentiation. As a result,
individuals were less easily recognized as belonging to one community or
another. At the same time, the religious communities as a whole becamemore
visible in the public domain; they were allowed to build large complexes with
churches and synagogues, schools, and hospitals. They also organized expres-
sive public processions that showed off the differences between Christians of
various kinds as much as between Muslims and non-Muslims. While this may
seem contradictory, both the mostly unproblematic public display of Chris-
tian symbols and buildings, and the new sartorial practices underline the same
basic point: modernization and its new norms of public presence started to
override the importance of distinguishing betweenMuslims and non-Muslims.
Notably, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sartorial practices again started to
reflect religious differences asmuchas regional and class differences, especially
for women. Muslim women tended to take up ‘Islamic’ dress in its different
forms while Christian women (if not forced by law or social pressure to dress
‘Islamic’) emphasized their freedom to dress ‘western’. At the same time, how-
ever, they started to wear visible cross pendants to identify as Christian.27
Yair Wallach, in the context of early twentieth-century Jerusalem, discusses
another aspect of the urban developments of the time, which is the emergence
of new types of neighborhoods. In all of the cities featured in this volume, Dam-
ascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Essouira, and Tunis, newneighborhoodswere
created outside the traditional city centers. In some cities such building activ-
27 Much has been written about the subtle codes of a variety of veiling practices, see among
others, Jenny B. White, “The Paradox of the New Islamic Woman in Turkey” in Inger
Marie Okkenhaug and Ingvild Flaskerud, Gender, Religion and Change in the Middle East.
Two Hundred Years of History (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2005), 123–136, Julia Droeber, The
Dynamics of Coexistence in the Middle East: Negotiating Boundaries Between Christians,
Muslims, Jews and Samaritans. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).
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ities had already begun in the nineteenth century, and took off in earnest in
the early twentieth century. These new middle-class neighborhoods exempli-
fied a new ideal of living, with freestanding buildings, preferably for individual
families (even if extended family living remained the norm), with gardens sur-
rounding them instead of the closed inner courtyards of the traditional houses.
Important for our discussion today, as also described by Wallach with regard
to his main protagonist Gad Frumkin, is the fact that these neighborhoods
were much more mixed as to religion than was the case in the old city cen-
ters. Though most of the old neighborhoods were not strictly segregated (see
Wallach’s description of Jerusalem, where he counters the popular images of
a city divided into four distinct neighborhoods), many neighborhoods would
indeed have amajority population of one religion,with small groups of families
belonging to other religions. What bound the inhabitants of these new neigh-
borhoods together was not the earlier communal concerns, but their shared
vision of what modern life should entail.
For many, these changing ideals about modern life included ideals about
the nation state, also when the fundamental principles of the new states were
yet to be negotiated. The ways in which the Jewish community of Baghdad
participated in the mourning ceremonies over the death of two successive
monarchs, King Fayṣal in 1933 and King Ghāzī in 1939, are indicative of their
desire to be part of that newly emerging national community, in the varying
political contexts of each event.Here the possibility of expressing itself publicly
as a Jewish community emphasizes the community’s adherence to national
ideals and its symbols, symbols that in that period included the Hashemite
monarchy’s rule over Iraq. In her contribution, Aline Schlaepfer examines the
Jewish community’s sincere sympathy for Fayṣal and much more cautious
assessment of Ghāzī, then juxtaposes the two occasions of mourning, first
for Fayṣal, then the much more expressive mourning for Ghāzī. Her analysis
underlines the political rather than emotional nature of these public stagings
of grief: at the time of Fayṣal’s death, the Jewish community still felt relatively
secure about their own position in Iraqi society, by the time Ghāzī died in 1939,
the Iraqi government’s flirtations with Nazism and the increased politicization
of Zionism in the wider Arab world made it all the more important to express,
as publicly and explicitly as possible, their adherence to the Iraqi state’s pan-
Arabist stance.
Such a message of ‘religious harmony and solidarity’28 has become a staple
of the rituals of nation states in theMiddle East and elsewhere,where occasions
28 Schlaepfer, this volume.
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of grief, joy or external threat are used to express solidarity and conformity
to the nation state. One of the earliest recorded events are the public cele-
brations, all over the Ottoman Empire, of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908.
Everywhere people of different religions went out into the streets together, cel-
ebrating the constitutional changes that were expected to bring more freedom
and more democratic rights to all citizens of the Ottoman state. These public
demonstrations in support of Ottomanism were joined by people of all reli-
gions, but certainly not by everyone in every group. Wallach writes about Gad
Frumkin, a young Ashkenazi Jewish journalist who reported on these celebra-
tions in Jerusalem, where Sephardic Jews participated in great numbers, but
Frumkin’s own Ashkenazi peers were conspicuously absent.29 Here, in con-
trast to the mourning rituals described by Schlaepfer, participation was not
communally staged, and might have been mostly an individual affair. Clearly
some parts of the Jewish community were much more interested in these new
Ottoman ideals than others.
These changing relationships between the various communal components
of the Ottoman Empire and its successor states constituted also a cause for
violence that often has been interpreted as ‘intercommunal.’ Massot’s detailed
analysis of the context of the events in Damascus in 1860, when Christians in
the Old City quarters were murdered and much of their property was looted
and destroyed, shows that this is a far too easy generalization. Indeed, the eigh-
teenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century saw an increased
politicization of the various non-Muslim communities, a politicization that
created what has been called a ‘sectarianism’ different from the forms of com-
munal identity that existed in the eighteenth century andbefore. This new type
of communal politics included, among other things, foreign protection of vari-
ous communities, with the British extending protection to Jews and Druze, the
French to the Eastern andOriental Catholic Christians, and the Russians to the
Greek (‘Rum’ or ‘Antiochian’) Orthodox. Such political protection, by virtue of
earlier treaties between the Ottoman Empire and foreign states, also brought
economic benefits, at least for some. It is the combination of political empow-
erment with economic advances thatmade the changes of the nineteenth cen-
tury difficult to bear for those Muslims who in the process lost political and
economic power. Therefore, asMassot argues, it was no coincidence that those
hardest hit by the events of 1860 in Damascus were those Christians with the
most obvious foreign connections and those who profited most visibly eco-
nomically, i.e., those living in the prominent newly renovated neighborhoods
29 Wallach (this volume) bases himself on Frumkin’s journal.
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of Bab Sharqi and Bab Tuma rather than those living in more modest quarters
in the Maydan (Midan) neighborhood. While indeed Muslims attacked Chris-
tians, the conflicts are much better explained by economic and social rivalries
among certain parts of the population, where the increased opportunities for
one group were envied by another, than by more general tensions between
Muslims and Christians.30
Arabic and Its Alternatives: Language and Education as Tools of
Belonging
When talking about ‘common ground’ and the role of the public sphere, the
importance of a common language can hardly be overstated. In discussions
on the emergence of the Arab states, therefore, the importance of Arabic is
explicitly emphasized.More in-depth analyses, however, on types ofArabic and
how they functioned as a means of communication between the various sub-
groups of these societies, are mostly lacking.31 Early nationalist authors such
as George Antonius and Edmond Rabbath, in their English and French writ-
ings stressed the link between spokenArabic and the Arab ‘race,’ with language
and race together forming the basis of the ideology of Arab nationalism on
which the emergent states were based. However, to account for the multiple
30 On the mid-nineteenth century violence in Lebanon/Syria, see Makdisi, A Culture of Sec-
tarianism, and recently Feras Krimsti, Die Unruhen von 1850 in Aleppo: Gewalt im urbanen
Raum (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2014). Similar violence took place in the Hakkari
Mountains (present-day Turkey) in the 1840s and 1850s; no monograph has yet been
devoted to it, but see the relevant chapters in J.F. Coakley, The Church of the East and the
Church of England. A History of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Assyrian Mission (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992), John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians of the Middle East: Encounters
with Western Christian Missions, Archaeologists, and Colonial Powers [Studies in Christian
Mission 26] (Leiden: Brill, 2000), andWilmshurst, TheMartyred Church.
31 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between Arabic and Arabic nationalism,
see Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity (Washington, dc: George-
town University Press, 2003), and from the same author, Arabic in the Fray: Language
Ideology and Cultural Politics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). For a recent
overview of a more strict sociolinguistic approach, see Reem Bassiouney, Arabic Sociolin-
guistics: Topics inDiglossia, Gender, Identity, andPolitics (Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity
Press, 2009). For the Lebanese case, see John E. Joseph, Language and Identity: National,
Ethnic, Religious (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and Franck Salameh, Language,
Memory, and Identity in the Middle East: The Case for Lebanon (Lanham, md: Lexington
Books, 2010).
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ways in which Arabic was part of the different communities that made up the
states they envisaged (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine), Arab nationalists allowed for
a rather flexible interpretation of what counted as Arabic, and, more impor-
tantly, for ‘assimilation’ and ‘devenir arabe’ with regard to culture and ethnic
belonging.32 Thus ‘being Arab’ was not necessarily an essentialist given, even
if, ultimately, ‘Arabness’ wasmeasured against a community’s linkwith the ulti-
mate Arabness of the Arabian Peninsula.33 However flexible this nationalist
ideology may have been (intended as it was to include as many groups as pos-
sible), it needed a clearly defined form of practiced Arabic to support it. This
‘Modern Standard Arabic’ (msa, or fuṣḥa), as it came to be called, was to func-
tion as ameasuring rod for the degree of commitment to Arabness, as a symbol
for a unity that did not yet exist.
However, the success of Modern Standard Arabic depended on the fact that,
true to its origins in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literary renewal,
it was much more than a nationalist tool.34 The standardized form of the
ClassicalArabic language emergedwhen theneed for new types of learning and
communication grewoutside theboundsof traditional religious learningbased
on the holy writs of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Members of literary and
journalistic circles transcended religious and regional differences and further
developed this particular form of Arabic that gradually, sometime between the
early and final decades of the nineteenth century, became the lingua franca
of the Middle East. As a lingua franca it was well placed to transcend a host
of linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences that threatened the success of
state formation. The successful duo that supported the emergent nationalism
was, therefore, linguistic modernization and standardization supported by the
modernization and standardization of education. It worked the other way
round as well: successful nation building (with the help of and in opposition to
the mandate powers) enhanced the importance of msa through state support
and control of education.
32 Rabbath, Unité Syrienne et devenier arabe (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1937), 43, 97. On the
related issue of the categories of ‘race’ and ‘religion’ in Palestine, see Jonathan Marc Gri-
betz, Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early Zionist-Arab Encounter (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014).
33 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 17. On Antonius’ linguistic ideologies, see Heleen Murre-
van den Berg, “The Language of the Nation: The Rise of Arabic among Jews and Christians
(1900–1950)”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2016), doi: 10.1080/13530194.2016
.1138641.
34 M.M. Badawi, Modern Arabic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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It is essential, however, to keep in mind that the link between national-
ism and educational and linguistic reform is by no means exclusive: a well-
developed lingua franca can easily be put to other uses, usages that may easily
contradict the tenets of particular nationalisms, be it in enabling rival political
ideologies such as communism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism, or in empow-
ering subgroups to pursue their own specific aims—from a Christian inter-
denominational ecumenism to trans-regional business practices. The multi-
ple functions of language, be they ideological, pragmatic or both, is one of
the main themes of the essays in the second part of the volume. The role of
Arabic in education, especially in private education as supported by western
missionary and philanthropic organizations, and in private essays and letters,
provides the starting point of the contributions by Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah,
Karène Summerer-Sanchez, and Tijmen Baarda.
Before discussing inmore detail themain conclusions of these three papers,
the specific characteristics of the common ground we discuss in this section
need to be delineated. Schools, especially those privately financed, constituted
a particular kind of middle ground between public and private. As Goldstein-
Sabbah argues in her paper on Jewish education in Baghdad, the administra-
tion of the various Jewish schools consciously devised their curricula and their
public presence with a view towards the Iraqi Nation, similar to (and partly
in conjunction with) the way the community devised the public rituals dis-
cussed by Schlaepfer. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Sanchez Sum-
merer’s paper, which describes how Catholic schools in Palestine reacted to
the changing times of themandate period. In addition, theCatholic Palestinian
schools, more so than those in Baghdad, also constituted places of encounter
just by virtue of their mixed population of pupils from Jewish, Muslim, and
Christian families. Put differently, themodern schools of the twentieth century
became places where, on a small scale, the sometimes conflicting ideological
and pragmatic aims of the sponsoring communities, parents, and wider public
(including governments) had to be negotiated in order to arrive at a workable
curriculum. Thus, what was negotiated in the schools reflected discussions in
the religious communities themselves, with all the nuances and differences
that came with it.
Two major conclusions emerge from the contributions of Sanchez Sum-
merer, Goldstein-Sabbah, and Baarda. The first is that in the two very different
contexts, that of the Jewish community in Baghdad and that of the Catholics
in Jerusalem, teaching of (and in) Arabic increased considerably over time
(with the support of the clergy, especially the Melkite patriarch), in order to
keep pace with the increased importance of Arabic at all levels of society
in both Iraq and Palestine. Basing himself on private correspondence within
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the Syriac community in northern Iraq, Baarda comes to a similar conclusion:
here too the use of Arabic was widespread and its standardized form gained
ground over and above non-standard forms.35 However, the second conclusion
of these papers must be that the strengthening of Arabic in each of these three
cases was less straightforwardly connected to nationalism and modernization
than one may have expected, mainly for two reasons: the interference of and
tensions with governments and external donors who favored languages other
than Arabic, and the conflicting ambitions within the communities them-
selves.
In Palestine, the Catholic schools that were sponsored and organized by
French congregations had to negotiate between the demands of the British
Palestinian government and those of the local population. French, which had
been an important language in Palestine until World War i, lost its status
under the mandate, and the official languages of the country became Arabic,
Hebrew, and English. Furthermore, the mandate system favored clear distinc-
tions between the Jewish-Hebrew system on the one hand, and the Arabic-
Palestinian system on the other. The Catholic schools that had previously func-
tioned mostly in a French-language context had to include English and more
Arabic in their curriculum in order to provide their pupils with the means to
function well in the local job market. In general, it seems that these develop-
ments were supported by the Arabic-speaking Catholics of Jerusalem, as they
probably were byMuslim parents that sent their children to these schools. This
change in focus implied that what in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury had effectively become the francophonie of Middle Eastern Catholicism,
now returned to its earlier arabophone leanings. As Sanchez Summerer notes,
the Vatican, which sought the creation of an ‘Arab’ Christianity, supported this
change. Ironically, French did indeed remain part of the curriculum, butmostly
because of its worldly, rather than its religious benefits.36
35 While the importance of Arabic among the Jews of Baghdad has been noted earlier (see
Goldstein-Sabbah and Schroeter in this volume), Schroeter points to the much more
varied picture for the rest of the Middle Eastern Jewish world. In many other places,
spoken forms of Arabic, and the written Judeo-Arabic, were replaced not by modern
Arabic, but by French (in North Africa) and English, or by Hebrew; for Hebrew, see
Wallach; note that his protagonist argued for better knowledge of Arabic in the Jewish
community.
36 On the importance of Arabic in the Catholic world of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, see Bernard Heyberger, Les chrétiens du Proche Orient au temps de la réforme
catholique (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athenes et de Rome 284; Rome: École
Françaises de Rome, 1994); Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Classical Syriac, Neo-Aramaic
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In Baghdad, too, government pressures led to an increase in Arabic teaching,
although the language had not been completely absent from Jewish communal
schools in thenineteenth andearly twentieth century. TheAlliance schools, the
most prestigious ones, with external funding, employed an Ottoman Turkish
curriculum that also included French and Ottoman Turkish. However, Arabic
also quickly gained importance in business and administration, perhaps more
than it did in Palestine, and soon the schools wholeheartedly cooperated in
increasing the amount and the level of Arabic. At the same time, as in Palestine,
English was added to the curriculum, after having been nearly absent from
most Baghdad schools.
As Goldstein-Sabbah notes in her overview of the Jewish communal school
system, the time devoted to Arabic varied considerably from one school to
another, with considerable differences not only between the more expensive
Alliance schools and themuch cheaper religious schools, but also between the
boys’ and girls’ schools of the Alliance. By comparing these different curricula
against the background of the governmental public schools, Goldstein-Sabbah
differentiates between the various goals of language teaching within the Jew-
ish community. Most goals were pragmatic and geared towards the future
roles of boys and girls in and outside the Jewish community. Well-off fami-
lies wanted their sons to know Arabic and English, because these were basic
essentials needed to compete for jobs in public administration and commerce.
Girls needed no such skills, and were taught high level French in addition to
more homely subjects such as sewing, embroidery, and hygiene. Girls of the
poorer families had little access to education; their parents had to make tough
choices whether to send their male siblings to the governmental schools for
a secular education in Arabic or to a free communal school that would teach
mostlyHebrewand religion.While all of this appears to be the rather pragmatic
outcome of needs and financial possibilities, Goldstein-Sabbah notes the inter-
play of these developments with larger changes in society. Not only was Arabic
first introduced at a larger scale under government pressure in the 1920s, but
when, in the 1940s, the nationalist rhetoric becamemore encompassing, all the
and Arabic in the Church of the East and the Chaldean Church between 1500 and 1800,” in
Holger Gzella, Margaretha L. Folmer (eds.), Aramaic in its Historical and Linguistic Setting
(Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommission 50;Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008),
335–352; Carsten Michael Walbiner, “Some Observations on the Perception and Under-
standing of Printing amongst the Arab Greek Orthodox (Melkites) in the Seventeenth
Century,” in Philip Sadgrove (ed.), Printing and Publishing in the Middle East (jss suple-
ment 24) (Oxford/Manchester, 2008), 65–76; and Georg Graf, Geschichte der christlichen
arabischen Literatur, 5 vols (Vatikanstadt, 1944–1955).
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schools increased their level of Arabic teaching, including the Laura Kadoorie
girls’ school and the religious Midrash Talmud Torah schools.
The growing importance of Modern Standard Arabic can also be examined
from the perspective of the language itself. Baarda’s contribution takes its start-
ing point in the Syriac communities of Iraq, to see how scholars used the lan-
guage in their correspondence in the 1920s. The two scholars whose Arabic
he analyzes, Mattai bar Paulus of Mosul (1861–1947) and Nematallah Denno
(1884–1951) both belonged to the Syriac Orthodox Church. Mattai was a dea-
conandanaccomplished scribe of Syriacmanuscripts, Nematallahpresumably
also knew Classical Syriac, the ecclesiastical language of the Syriac Orthodox
Church. Despite their scholarly proficiency in Classical Syriac, both used Ara-
bic in their writings: Mattai in his letters to Alphonse Mingana (c. 1870–1937),
another Syriac scholar who had continued his career in Great Britain (Birm-
ingham), Nematallah in a biographical note aboutMattai that presumably was
also sent to Mingana.37 As Baarda notes, such usage of Arabic for personal and
scholarly communication is not unexpected, because in the Syriac Orthodox
communities of northern Iraq, Arabic had long been established as a spoken
vernacular and in the form of a substandard ‘Middle Arabic’ form for writing,
including the translation of Classical Syriac texts. This form of substandard,
dialectally influenced Arabic was, until the early twentieth century, usually
written in Syriac script, and as such indicated by the term ‘Garshuni.’ In the
twentieth century, the use of Garshuni quickly diminished, and standardized
Arabic in Arabic script increased. It is surprising that Mattai and Nematallah
used two diametrically opposed forms of written Arabic, in ways contrary to
what we knew so far. Mattai writes with a well-formed Arabic handwriting,
but includes a number of substandard grammatical forms that do not take
into account the recent standardizations of Arabic. Nematallah, by contrast,
writes in Garshuni but in perfectly standardized Arabic. Perhaps the expla-
nation is to be found in different educational trajectories: Mattai was trained
earlier in traditional schools andNematallah, being younger, was educated in a
moremodern school. However, we knowalmost nothing about these twomen’s
personal histories, so this remains conjectural. Even more conjectural are the
possible reasons for the Garshuni in Nematallah’s text. Did he want to impress
Mingana with his Syriac handwriting? Or did he agree with those in the Syriac
community who thought that for internal purposes clergy and scholars should
use the Syriac script (even for Arabic) to express their solidarity with the Syr-
37 Nematallah’s text ended up in the collection ofMattai’s letters toMingana in Birmingham;
see Baarda in this volume for the details.
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iac Christian community? Or did he intend to emphasize his Syriac communal,
nationalist, leanings? Or was the text originally addressed to a different, local
northern Iraqi clerical audience that would have preferred Syriac script?
Whatever the reasons for Nematallah’s remarkable choice of Garshuni, its
mere occurrence alerts us to the fact that the general picture of a straightfor-
ward development inwhichArabic becomes standardized and other languages
lose ground, may need further refinement, if only to account for the erratic
ways inwhich individuals at variouspointsmade their ownchoices. If anything,
these examples, like the trajectories of the curricula of the communal schools in
Baghdad and Jerusalem,make clear that the choice of Arabic was not necessar-
ily one that wasmotivated by Arab nationalism, even if the Christians involved
may have been loyal supporters of Iraqi or Palestinian nationalist aims.
The Rough Edges of the Nation State: Between Belonging and
Expulsion
Commongroundbetween the various communities thatmake up a nation can-
not always be found. Many contributions in this volume touch on the negative
side of the search for communalities, the failures, the stories of exclusion and
expulsion, rather than integration. Peaceful coexistence or at the very least
benign neglect were not always possible. Violence against non-Muslims, as
discussed in Massot’s article, usually arises from a complex interplay of socio-
economic and political factors, playing out on a particular subgroup, which in
that moment embodies societal anxieties. The violence against Christians in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included these same ingredi-
ents, but then became exacerbated by nationalist ideologies that generalized
the violence to an extent theseChristian communities hadnot yet experienced.
It was mostly Turkish nationalism, in conjunction with the very real interna-
tional pressures upon the Ottoman Empire from Russia, France and England
that paved theway for the genocide onArmenian and Syriac Christians in East-
ern Anatolia, Hakkari and northwestern Iran. The Christian communities of
North Iraq, as well as those from Lebanon/Syria, weremostly spared—it seems
that for the Young Turks, the Arab provinces warranted a different political
regime. In addition, the Armenians had incurred Turkey’s wrath by passively
or actively supporting the Russians, hoping to gain some kind of independence
out of it—providing yet another pretext for the wholesale expulsion of Arme-
nians from Eastern Turkey, an expulsion in most cases accompanied by the
gruesome murder of the adult men and followed by the deaths of many who
were put on marches to the Syrian desert.
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Much has been written about the Armenian genocide, while the simulta-
neous massacres on Syriac, Assyrian and Chaldean Christians yet awaits full
inclusion into the scholarly debate about this violent episode of Middle East-
ern history. The expulsion and population transfer that befell the so-called
‘Greek’ Christians of Anatolia (who were mostly Turkish speaking) falls mostly
outside the scope of this volume.38 What is especially relevant for the current
volume, is the fact that many of the genocide survivors, especially those from
the Armenian and Syriac communities, ended up in the Arab mandate states,
in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Although there had beenmodest
Armenian and Syriac communities in most of these countries, there numbers
swelled considerably by the new arrivals. This was the case especially in Beirut
andAleppowhichwelcomed large Syriac andArmenian populations. In places
like Jerusalem, BethlehemandAmman, the communitieswere practically new.
While the actual civil status of these refugeesdiffered fromplace toplace and
country to country, most at some point received citizenship and were officially
integrated into the new states. However, despite the fact that often they were
not so different from the Christian communities that had already longtime
roots in a particular region, many of these communities assumed a low profile
and in many respects can be seen as the first Christian minorities. Most came
with little Arabic and preferred to maintain the language and culture of their
Anatolian hometowns. Also after many had caught up on Arabic and had
managed to build up their lives again, their connection to the new Arab states
was fundamentally different from that of the Christians who had lived there
formany generations. Formost, and inmost locations, aminority position that
allowed for the development of separate Syriac or Armenian identities fitted
their needs well.39
Such type of minority integration, however, did not fit the wishes of the
Assyrians from Hakkari many of whom had ended up in a refugee camp in
38 On the Armenian genocide, Taner Akcam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and
the Question of Turkish Responsibility (London: Constable & Robinson, 2007) Hans Lukas
Kieser: Der verpasste Friede: Mission, Ethnie und Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Türkei,
1839–1938 (Zürich: Chronos, 2000); on the Syriac genocide, called Sayfo/Saypa (‘Sword’),
see David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern
Anatolia during World War i (Piscataway, nj: Gorgias Press, 2006) and Florence Hellot-
Bellier, Chroniques demassacres annoncés: Les Assyro-Chaldéens d’ Iran en duHakkari face
aux ambition des empire, 1896–1920 (Paris: Geuthner, 2014).
39 Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “A Center of Transnational Syriac Orthodoxy: St. Mark’s
Convent in Jerusalem,” Journal of Levantine Studies 3, no. 1 (2013): 61–83, Migliorino,
(Re)Constructing Armenia.
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Baʿquba. Their refusal to be integrated as Christian minority tragically ended
in government-sanctioned massacre in Semele (North Iraq) in 1933. In sev-
eral contributions to this volume, this event, which until recently had received
rather limited academic treatment, is discussed. In current literature, the mas-
sacre of at least 360 disarmed men and a few women in the village of Semele
by army troops led by army commander Bakr Sidqi (against a background of
looting and killings in Assyrian villages in a wider area of north Iraq), is seen
as a telltale event in the formation of the Iraqi state.40 While in Assyrian his-
toriography the events have often been interpreted as the logical outcome of
British betrayal in combination with long-term anti-Christian sentiments in
Iraqi society,41 authors such as Husry and Zubaida stress the difficult position
in which the Assyrians had placed themselves, a position that made them an
easy target in a period of uncertain leadership and fierce discussions about the
direction of the Iraqi state. At the time, many Iraqis understood the violence
against these Assyrians as part of a national struggle against a rebellious group
with British sympathies, a group that could count on little sympathy from the
general population in Baghdad and other urban centers like Mosul and Basra,
be they Christian, Jewish or Muslim.
As shown by Schlaepfer, in that context Bakr Sidqi’s military actions worked
in uniting the rest of population in support of the new government. The Assyri-
ans themselves, though united in horror about what happened, were internally
divided over the political course that had led to these massacres; many did not
endorse the patriarch’s attempt to advocate a separate status for the Assyrian
Christian community, a status with greater legal and temporal powers for the
40 See the discussion of the literature by Sami Zubaida, “Contested Nations: Iraq and the
Assyrians,”Nations and Nationalism 6, no. 3 (2000): 363–382 and my interpretation of the
importance of the event for the Assyrians in Heleen Murre-van den Berg, “Light from
the East (1948–1954) and the De-Territorialization of the Assyrian Church of the East,”
in Wim Hofstee and Arie van der Kooij (eds.), Religion beyond its Private Role in Modern
Society (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 115–134. The earlier work of Joseph, The Modern Assyrians
and Khaldun S. Husry, “The Assyrian Affair of 1933,” International Journal of Middle East
Studies 5 (1974), 161–176 (i) and 344–360 (ii), as well as the contemporary analysis by
R.S. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935),
remain important. For a recent re-evaluation of the sources from an Assyrian perspective,
see Donabed, Reforging a Forgotten History.
41 Assyrian historiography is based largely on Yaquw bar Malek Ismail, Āturāyē w-trēy plāšē
tbīlāyē, h.d., Āturāyē men 1914 hal 1945 (‘Assyrians and the Two World Wars, i.e., Assyrians
between 1914 and 1945’; Tehran: Maṭbaʿtā d-sīʿta seprāytā d-ʿallīmē Āturāyē, 1964); Yusuf
Malek, The British Betrayal of the Assyrians (Chicago: The Assyrian National Federation
and The Assyrian National League of America, 1935).
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patriarch and some kind of regional independence, and therefore fundamen-
tally different from that of other Christian communities in Iraq. Many of the
Assyrians, like the Chaldeans with whom they shared a long common history
in northern Iraq, preferred non-preferential treatment by the Iraqi government
and were inclined to acknowledge the state’s power, relinquish dreams of a
separate homeland, and allow restricting the clergy’s powers to the spiritual
realm.42
The contributions by Laura Robson and Hannah Müller-Sommerfeld
address the importance of a refugee camp for displaced Assyrians and Armeni-
ans in understanding the dynamics of the failed inclusion of the Assyrians into
the Iraqi state. The Baʿquba camp, not far from Baghdad, was set up under the
responsibility of the League of Nations and administered by British officials. It
arose from the need to cater to the tribal Assyrians who had been forced to flee
first the Hakkari province (in today’s eastern Turkey) to Urmia (in northwest-
ern Iran), from where they joined the Russian and Armenian armies in their
fight against Turkish and Kurdish troops.When the situation in Urmia deterio-
rated after the Russians retreated early in January 1918 and Turkish andKurdish
forces oncemoremarched up to Urmia in Iran, many Assyrians decided to flee
towards British-ruled territory in Iraq, preferring British protection opposed to
Persian protection. In this period, the Assyrian leadership had been made to
believe that the British would support not only resettlement in their ancestral
homelands in Hakkari, but also some kind of Wilsonian semi-independence.
Thus, for the Assyrians from Hakkari, the camp in Baʿquba essentially was a
temporary provision before they could return to the north.43
While differing in their analysis of the causes, both Robson and Müller-
Sommerfeld underline the significance of the camp in creating a newminority
identity for the Assyrians. In the camp, the Assyrians were treated as stateless
refugees, who, being largely dependent on the British colonial administration
for jobs, education, and sustenance, were inspired to re-invent themselves in
the post-war era away from Iraqi society. Robson stresses the way in which
the camp, by virtue of its specific organizational and spatial set-up, fostered
42 Murre-van den Berg, “Light from the East,” andMüller-Sommerfeld in this volume. On the
Chaldeans in this period little has been written so far, but see Wilmshurst, The Martyred
Church.
43 For more detail, see the contributions by Robson and Müller-Sommerfeld in this volume;
the standard work for this period is John Joseph, The Modern Assyrians; see also the
overview work byWilmshurst, TheMartyred Church. The most detailed discussion of this
episode, based on many new sources, is found in Hellot-Bellier, Chroniques de massacres
annoncés; she also traces the history of the much contested British promises (497–506).
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separate ‘national’ identities for the Assyrians and the Armenians. The two
groups were separated as much as possible from each other and from Iraqi
society, with educational programs in the camp focusing on preparing pupils
for a future return to a ‘homeland’ with some kind of separate existence from
the Iraqi or Turkish states. Whereas Robson emphasizes the British agency
in this respect,44 Müller-Sommerfeld, by studying the so far largely untapped
archives of the League of Nations, shows that the Assyrians themselves were
keen to fully employ the League of Nations’ system of minority protection in
their favor. Her study of the archives underlines the divisions within Assyrian
society, not only between those in the camp (mostly from Hakkari) and those
outside the camp (Assyrians that had always lived in what was to become the
state of Iraq), but also among the Assyrians from Hakkari, who had conflicting
regional and familial interests. Earlier tribal and regional subdivisions often
translated into different political positions among those who contested the
leadership of the patriarchal family.
In the final analysis, the outcome of the process was that the Baʿquba camp,
instead of easing the transition from being stateless refugees to becoming
integrated citizens of the Iraqi state, sanctioned their separate trajectories.
Even after it had become clear (Lausanne Conference, 1922–1923, final decision
in 1925) that the Assyrians would not be allowed to return to Hakkari, nor
would they be granted (semi-)independence within the new borders of Iraq,
both the British and the League of Nations failed to convince the Assyrians
to come to terms with this loss. The deep chasm between the nationalist
hopes of the Assyrian leadership, especially the party supporting the young
patriarchMar ShimunEshai (in office 1920–1975), and the avowedaimofBritish
and Iraqi government officials to integrate the Assyrians in a multi-ethnic
and multi-religious Iraq, played a crucial role in developments leading up to
the dramatic events of the summer of 1933. The patriarch was unwilling to
consider proposals for the resettlement of the Hakkari Assyrians in other parts
of northern Iraq, and even more unwilling to relinquish his temporal powers
over the community and limit his leadership to the spiritual. Probably driven
by fear of whatmight happen to the Assyrians once their British protectors had
left Iraq, the patriarch refused to let the Hakkari Assyrians integrate into Iraqi
society. Mar Shimon Eshai’s refusal to adapt to the changing circumstances
and instead to allow for the armed resistance of Assyrians in the north, were
important factors in the chain of events that led to themassacre of Semele. This
played out at a moment in time when power struggles in Iraq’s administrative
44 Cf. also Sanchez Summerer in this volume.
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circles had destabilized the country and the events were easily framed as yet
another indication of the Assyrian threat to Iraqi national unity. It was only
towards the end of 1948 that the patriarch, who was forced into exile in 1933,
officially relinquished his temporal powers and the Assyrian community in
many ways became like other non-Muslim communities in Iraqi society: full
citizens of an Arab state rather than a minority waiting for its full rights.45
The story does not end here, though. While the Assyrians from Baʿquba
obtained Iraqi citizenship and settled in the north or in Baghdad, or emigrated
to nearby Syria wheremanyHakkari Assyrians found a place to live,46 or places
further away, the tensions surrounding their place in Iraqi society were not
over. Though some of the most ardent Assyrian nationalists emigrated to Syria
or the United States, the old separatist nationalism remained popular among
Assyrians in the north, in the slipstream of Kurdish nationalism. Suffering with
the Kurds under Saddam’s genocide in the 1980s, the Assyrians profited from
independence from Saddam’s Iraq in the early 1990s and were able to build
up a Syriac (Aramaic)-based educational system and other cultural institu-
tions.47 Different from the Armenian and Syriac refugees that settles in Syria
and Lebanon, the Assyrians found it difficult to settle for amere quietistminor-
ity existence. At the same time, full cultural and linguistic integration, such
as sought after by many Chaldeans, was practically anathema to the Assyri-
ans, even if individuals, especially after World War ii, would make different
choices.
Thus, in conclusion, one could attribute the Assyrians’ clash with the Iraqi
nation state to a combination of their well-developed and thoroughly modern
sense of their own national identity (based on an older tradition of political,
social, and cultural independence), and their displacement, vulnerability, and
colonial complicity in the post-war era. In deciding what was the most impor-
45 See Müller-Sommerfeld, this volume; Joseph, TheModern Assyrians, 175 ff.
46 Shabo Talay, Die neuaramäischen Dialekte der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien: Ein-
führung, Phonologie und Morphologie (Semitica viva, Bd. 40; Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz,
2008).
47 On Assyrians and Chaldeans in the twentieth century, see Herman Teule, Les Assyro-
Chaldéens. Chrétiens d’ Irak, d’ Iran et de Turquie (Turnhout: Brepols 2008); Heleen Murre-
van den Berg, “The Syriac Churches,” in Ken Parry, The Blackwell Companion to Eastern
Christianity (Malden/Oxford/Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 249–268; Wilmshurst,
The Martyred Church; and J.F. Coakley, “The Church of the East since 1914,” in J.F. Coakley
and K. Parry, “The Church of the East: Life and Thought,” Bulletin of the John Rylands
University Library 78, no. 3 (1996): 179–198, Suha Rassam, Christianity in Iraq: Its Origins
and Development to the Present Day (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2005).
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tant factor in this, wemust take into accountMüller-Sommerfeld’s observation
that in addition to the Assyrians, two other groups in Iraq started using the
vocabulary of minorities: the Kurds and the Bahaʾis. Other Christians and the
Jews refrained from doing so; they, with whatever uncertainties they may have
felt for their future, identified at least superficially with the nationalist defini-
tions of Iraq, with its combination of Arabism and state secularism. Clearly, the
state’s emphasis onArabic andArabismexcludedKurds,who emphasized their
own different ethnic identity; this was an exclusion that was mitigated only
slightly by some cooptation of Kurds in the central government. The exclusion
of the Bahaʾis reminds us that this state secularism was predicated on Islamic
definitions of acceptable religions, and thus in practicemostly excluded newer
religions such a Bahaʾism. In hindsight we may say that this implicit Islamic
premise of acceptable religious difference proved the starting point for more
extremist interpretations at a later phase.
Transnational Dynamics
Meanwhile, another nation state in the making was to create its own minori-
ties, inside and outside the country. The creation of the state of Israel, with the
official backing of the United Nations, changed the rules of who belonged to
the majority population overnight. This was the case in the confines of the
new-born state of Israel, where many Palestinians were forced to flee during
the war of 1948 and those that remained became minorities in a state that was
predicated on Zionism, Judaism, and Hebrew. In reaction to this, Jewish com-
munities in many places in the Middle East were cast as unwanted minorities,
whether or not they identified with this new state and its non-Arabic identity,
andwhether or not they themselves preferred to see themselves as such. These
events underline how issues of majority andminority are related not merely to
the nation state as such, but to the nation state in its regional and transnational
connections. That is, processes of minoritization and the success or failure of
‘common grounds’ cannot be understood without also taking into account the
process of migration (caused by varying degrees of material violence as well
as social, economic, and politic pressures) and the emergence of transnational
communities.
As referred to above, World War i led to the emergence of a number of
refugee communities of Syriac, Assyrian, and Armenian Christians, mostly
from today’s Turkey. These population movements changed the social dynam-
ics ofmany places in the ArabMiddle East: these Christians becameminorities
in urban areas such as Jerusalem, Beirut, Aleppo, Baghdad, Cairo, and Mosul,
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whereas the rural Jazirah region in northeast Syria was transformed by the
influxofChristian farmers fromeasternAnatolia and later byHakkariAssyrians
expulsed by Iraq.48 In addition, large groups of Syriacs, Assyrians and Armeni-
ans moved outside the region, to the Americas, to the southern states of the
ussr, and to Europe. In the process they created ever expanding transnational
networkswith nodes both in and near their places of origin and throughout the
rest of the world. These nodes and networks that were created in the interwar
years made use of trajectories and expatriate communities that were estab-
lished in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then too, violence and
social pressure played a role in stimulating migration (the first large group left
Lebanon/Syria after the massacres of 1860), though longstanding commercial
networks (especially those created by Persian Armenians in the seventeenth
century) and contacts in the Christian world (Catholic networks of the six-
teenth century onwards and Protestant connections built in the nineteenth
century) were just as important.49
Thus it is no surprise that these transnational networks play a role in many
of the contributions to this volume even if these networks, as such, are not the
principle theme. When one reads the articles in the volume from this perspec-
tive, one is inclined to assume that the rapid expansion of these transnational
networks often impeded the further development of common ground that pro-
vides space for discussions about the common good. The transnational space
that the Iraqi Jews created for themselves, in which they were culturally, famil-
ially, commercially, and religiously bound to Asia, Palestine, England, France,
and America, made it easier to disconnect themselves from Iraq when societal
pressures increased. Similarly for the Assyrians from Hakkari, whose ties with
Russia, Lebanon, Europe, and America dated from before World War i.
48 Sedah Altuğ, “Sectarianism in the Syrian Jazira: Community, Land and Violence in the
Memories of World War i and the French Mandate (1915–1939)” (PhD, Utrecht University,
2011); Talay, Shabo, Die neuaramäischen Dialekte der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien. Ein-
führung,PhonologieundMorphologie (Wiesbaden:Harrasowitz, 2008), idem,Neuaramäis-
che Texte in den Dialekten der Khabur-Assyrer in Nordostsyrien (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz,
2009).
49 Albert Hourani, Nadim Shehadi, The Lebanese in theWorld: A Century of Emigration (Lon-
don: The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), Naures Atto, Hostages in the Homeland,
Orphans in the Diaspora: Identity Discourses among the Assyrian/Syriac Elites in the Euro-
pean Diaspora (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011), Murre-van den Berg, H.L. (2002),
“Migration of Middle Eastern Christians to Western Countries and Protestant Missionary
Activities in theMiddle East. A Preliminary Investigation,” in The Journal of Eastern Chris-
tian Studies [Formerly Het Christelijk Oosten] 54, 1–2, 39–49.
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The situation was somewhat different for the Catholics in Jerusalem and
Palestine at large. While their connections to the French-Catholic world ini-
tiallymayhaveheld themback in their identificationwithArab andPalestinian
nationalism, in later decades these wider Catholic networks stimulated their
identification with the region, rather than with the West in general or France
in particular. Thus, depending on the further religious and political develop-
ments within these networks, they either grew into alternative communities
or into support structures for local identification. Though overall the Catholic
(and the Protestant) network might have been more effective in stimulating
local rootedness, in the end its effects are the same as with the other transna-
tional networks. The mere existence of such networks made the communities
vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty to the state, while at the same time these
networks increased the access of the communities to opportunities outside the
region.
In the period following World War ii, the benefits of migration mostly went
both ways, with the transnational connections and transcultural skills that
camewith it serving theChristian communities in theMiddleEast.When in the
1960s and 1970s the Arab countries were eager to take further steps on the road
of cultural and economic westernization, it was often the Christians that func-
tioned as cultural brokers. Christians were relatively well educated and much
more acquainted with western mores and habits; they spoke the languages of
theWest as well as the languages of the region, in literal and metaphoric ways.
As a result, they occupied crucial and highly visible positions in public life, in
education, journalism, music, literature and arts, science and medicine, thus
contributing actively and publicly to the creation of a common ground.
From the late 1970s onwards, however, this fragile equilibrium started to
break down. The Christians’ position as cultural brokers was challenged by
the double effect of a quickly growing well-educated Muslim middle class
that competed for the same jobs in societies that increasingly looked in other
directions than Europe and America for ideological inspiration, cultural role
models, and economic power, be it to Turkey, China or the Gulf.50 At the same
time, political instability in the region made for increased migration of the
Christian communities. Palestinian Christians followed their co-religionist to
50 Tarek Mitri, “Christians in the Arab East: An Interpretation of Contemporary History,” in
Habib Badr, et al., Christianity: A History in the Middle East (Beirut: Middle East Council
of Churches, 2005), 933 pp; Translated from: Al Masiḥiyya ʿAbra Tārīkhihā fī al-Mashreq
(Beirut: Middle East Council of Churches, 2001), 851–867; Najib George Awad, And Free-
dom Became a Public-Square: Political, Sociological and Religious Overviews on the Arab
Christians and the Arabic Spring (Vienna/Berlin: lit Verlag, 2012).
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the America’s after the war of 1967, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and
the West Bank. Massive migration from Lebanon started in 1975, when both
Christians andMuslims fled the devastations wrought by the Civil War. Coptic
Christians started to leave Egypt from the 1970s onwards, first to other places
in the Middle East, then also to the America’s, Europe, Australia and Africa.
Meanwhile, the small Syriac community from Turkey was caught in the war
between the Turkish army and the pkk (1980s–1990s). From 1990 onwards,
political and economic pressures pressured Iraq’s Christians to migrate, seeing
ever increasing numbers from 2003 onwards when during what grew to be a
straightforward civil war, Christians were targeted expressly, mostly by Sunni
extremists.
All of this did not immediately break down the communality betweenChris-
tians and Muslims that had been created in the first part of the twentieth
century. Much of the structures and places of encounter remained intact. The
combination, however, of numerical and cultural marginalization of the Chris-
tianswith the increased political clout of the diaspora communities,made for a
different dynamic, both within the Christian communities and between them
and the rest of society. It is then that the concept of minority again becomes
important. For the first time also those communities that for most of the twen-
tieth century resisted the label of ‘minority’, seeing themselves as part of the
‘majority’ community of Arabs, such as theCopts, theGreek (Antiochian/Rum)
Orthodox and Greek Catholics, started to use the label. As has been recently
described by SabaMahmood, the complex interplay of realizing that the equal
rights that had been expected never fully materialized, the pressures of minor-
ity discourses originating in the diaspora communities and in international
organizations, and the internal, Middle Eastern rhetoric about the state, all
contributed to theminoritization of those Christians that, different from those
displaced in the various wars, had never left their countries of origin and had
always been loyal supporters of the Arab states.51
Much of the transnational dynamics affecting Jews and Christians in the
Middle East is not so different from what happens in other parts of the world
where a combination of socio-political, economic and cultural factors gave rise
to large expatriate diasporic communities that maintain a connection to their
homelands. There is one cultural factor, however, that is fairly unique, which
is the fact Jerusalem and the surrounding region occupy a special place in
three religions, the adherents of two of them together, Christianity and Islam,
counting for over half of the world’s population. Whereas certainly not every
51 Mahmood, Religious Difference.
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Christian or Muslimworldwide is invested in the so called ‘holy places’, at least
part of the cultural and political interest in the region from other parts of the
world can be explained by these cultural-religious connections. Much of the
missionary and humanitarian efforts from Catholics and Protestants in the
modern period arose from a heightened interest in the state of Christianity in
the lands of its birth, trying to save and preserve it, not only for its own sake,
but as much for that of global Christianity, many parts of which consider the
Holy Land as part of their religious heritage. The rise of Zionism (including its
Christian varieties) and the ensuing Israeli state further added to the global
public with stakes in the region. While sometimes these global interests in
the region have contributed to the creation of common ground, often the
multiplicity of actors and stakeholders has exacerbated many of the processes
of contestation and exclusion described above.52
Boum’s article highlights the importance of Jerusalemas a cultural and polit-
ical symbol for Christians andMoslems of theMiddle East, taking the perspec-
tive of the disenfranchised youth of North Africa. Their hip hop songs sample
the rich repertoire of cultural themes that were produced in earlier phases of
Arab resistance to the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, a repertoire that ranges
from the violent and aggressive videos of Islamists, to the melancholy work of
Fayrūz, the Christian Lebanese singer (NihādWadīʿ Ḥaddād, b. 1934). However,
while the texts and symbols of these North African musicians are explicitly
aggressive and activist, overall the political and cultural effects of these videos
remain limited. Not only is the number of people that watch these videos not
as high as the topicality of the issue leads us to expect, but more importantly,
their activist stance has little to no effect on the politics of North African states,
while the rappers, even if they attract the attention of the security forces, do
not seriously threaten the status quo. As such, the musicians are reproached
by other young North African activists who would rather invest more time in
real life political activism than in online cultural expressions.53
52 See, e.g. several articles in the edited volume Journal of Levantine Studies 3, no. 1 (2013),
Steven Kaplan and Merav Mack’s “Editors’ Note”, Galia Sabar, “Between Israel and the
Holy Land, between the Global and the Local: The Role of African Initiated Churches
within African Transnational Migration to Israel,” Adoram Schneidleder, “The Imagined
Christian Ecumene and the Quest for Return: Christian idps in Israel and the 2009
Visit of Benedict xvi,” Michelle Syen, “E-Transnationalism: The Case of the Christian
Zionist Community in Israel,” and Steven Kaplan, “The Transnationalism of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Tawahedo Church in the Holy Land.”
53 For a discussion of the fast growing field of research on online cultural expressions and
identity politics, see Boum’s contribution in this volume.
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Meanwhile, the ongoing civil war in Syria, with constantly rising numbers of
casualties, homeless refugees, and devastated urban landscapes, has produced
its own varieties of global performances, with musical expressions intended
to address the world’s silence in the face of cultural and political disaster. A
case in point is the controversial video clip produced by two Syrian sisters from
Sweden, Faia and Rihan Younan from Aleppo.54 ‘To our countries’ (li-biladi)
consists of a mixture of classically phrased political statements written and
recited by Faia (an Edinburgh-trained journalist), and tied in with fragments
of songs by Fayrūz sung by Rihan (including the song on Jerusalem discussed
in Boum’s volume); the video clip was shared widely, both in the West and the
Middle East. The minimalist video conveys the pain over what is happening
in the Middle East; it skillfully distributes blame without naming anyone in
particular, and brings together in one nostalgic narrative the cases of Syria,
Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine while glossing over differences of religion and
politics. While many people appreciated the sisters’ efforts to bring the woes
of the Arab world to the fore, critical voices soon chimed in, most importantly
because the sisters were seen as supporting the Assad regime. Others criticized
their perceived one-sided blaming of the West for the Middle East’s problems,
and yet others blamed the sisters for denying their ‘Assyrian’ background and
glossing over the way in which the Assyrians were treated by the Arabs. Where
the sisters and their crew thought they could transcend differences of religion,
region, and ethnicity by creating hope built upon the idealized Middle East of
Fayrūz’s generation, others saw this as hopelessly naïve and old-fashioned, and
in no way relevant to resolving the real conflicts in the Middle East.55 Indeed,
verbal contests about how clips like this one contribute to lasting peace in the
Middle East continue against the background of youth who take matters into
their own hands by joining the armed struggle against the Assad regime and
more generally against what is seen as the West oppressing Muslims.
54 YouTube, ‘To our countries’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4GO52i0xui8), posted 9
October 2014, 1,786,114 viewings (13 February 2015).
55 For more extensive discussions, in addition to the postings on YouTube, see http://www
.taz.de/Youtube-Video-Li-Biladi/!148495/ (largely positive; last seen 28 January 2015), Eli
Shalal, http://www.aljadid.com/content/twisted-logic-younan-sisters-and-julia-boutros-
sing-same-deceptive-tune (very critical; last seen 28 January 2015), building on an article
by Martina Sabra on Qantara.de (http://de.qantara.de/inhalt/syrisches-antikriegs-video
-to-our-countries-peinlicher-medienhype; last seen 28 January 2015); see also Daily Star
(31 October 2014) http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Oct-31/276015-
supporters-opponents-of-assad-in-viral-video-confrontation.ashx (last seen 28 January
2015).
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What then, does thismean for the dynamics betweenmajorities andminori-
ties in the states of the Middle East, what does this mean for the creation
andmaintenance of common ground?Most importantly, perhaps, the transna-
tional and global stage of cultural practices is here to stay. Whether in the form
of YouTube videos, online political activism, world politics, Christian Zionism
and Catholic advocacy for Middle-Eastern Christians, or in the attempts by
ngos, unhcr, and unesco tomitigate the worst effects of war and strife, or in
violent jihadist actions, all actors perform on a global stage and seek a global
public that is asked to choose sides. Even if much of that involvement does not
go beyond ‘liking’ and ‘retweeting’, it considerably widens the circle of people
that have a stake in thedevelopments on the ground.Certainly, thepositive side
of this is the fact that abuses of power, gross injustice and oppression ofminori-
ties can find a hearing much quicker and in wider circles than before, putting
extra pressure on governments to adjust their policies and protect minorities.
At the same time, however, these global performers all too easy may lose sight
of the complicated dynamics of local context, the value of silent diplomacy
and saving face in difficult situations—valuing applause on the global scene
over concrete results on the ground. Minorities of all kinds thus may suffer
as much as gain from such global involvement, especially where the state is
weak and unable to protect those who for political, cultural or religious rea-
sons are not considered part of the majority that exemplifies the unity of the
state.
Conclusions
The overview by Schroeter of Jews in the Middle East and the varied case
studies that are brought to the fore in this volume vacillate between opposite
positions, one in which we can see a wide range of possibilities of finding
common ground and the other, which makes obvious the limits to that same
endeavor. Yes, there is a common ground, but it is fragile and its survival is
verymuchdependent on the circumstances. These circumstances therefore are
important in the analyses of this volume, and indicate the importance of stable
and strong states that allow for a variety of interpretations of the definition
of and criteria for citizenship. These definitions and criteria must be enforced
against those that challenge it by advocatingmono-cultural, mono-ethnic, and
mono-religious societies. The case studies also point to the importance of
understanding how communities that are seen as minorities (whether they
like it or not), deal with that minority status. Are they able to negotiate the
boundaries of their separateness with a view towards the common good of
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these societies as a whole? Or do they, with or without outside support, focus
on their own survival only and so willingly and unwillingly contribute to their
isolation?
The case studies show that, time and again, common ground was found: in
Arabic as the language of the nation, in shared educational and cultural activ-
ities, and in political parties and social activism, even though that sometimes
also led to new fissures and schisms—schisms, however, not between the all-
to-easy essentialized boundaries between religious or ethnic communities, but
between people with different opinions and different social and regional back-
grounds. History tells of many occasions in which religion was not a hindrance
to cooperation, when Jews and Christians, despite their numerical minority
within a society that structures itself on religion, could function optimally in
society at large. It is from these cross-cutting cleavages, and the ways in which
these cleavages were bridged time and again, that we can draw hope for the
future, even if today’s trends seem bound towards greater uniformity and less
tolerance towards those who do not fit.
